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An Argument for Original Intent: Restoring
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to Protect Domestic
Violence Victims in a Post-Crawford World
Andrew King-Ries*
I. Introduction
In the thirty years since the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, American society has become much more aware of
the domestic violence epidemic. The numbers are truly stagger-
ing: intimate partner violence accounts for twenty percent of
crimes against women; one out of every ten violent victimiza-
tions is the result of family violence; 1.5 million women are
abused annually by their partners; one in five women has ex-
perienced an attempted or completed rape; and marital rape ac-
counts for twenty-five percent of all rapes, affecting over 75,000
women each year.' Some studies announce results that are ar-
guably more chilling, such as those showing that homicide is
the second leading cause of death among pregnant women. 2
Despite these statistics, prosecution of domestic violence re-
mains problematic. Largely due to pressure from defendants,
victims overwhelmingly refuse to testify or recant their initial
statements implicating the defendant.3 Victims report a host of
* Assistant Professor, Montana University School of Law; B.A., Brown Uni-
versity, 1988; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis, 1993. I owe many thanks
to Kristin King-Ries for her wonderful editing assistance and encouragement, to
Michelle Bryan Mudd for her comments on earlier drafts, and to Jason Johns for
his outstanding research assistance.
1. Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Im-
pact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 325-26
(2005); DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS (Nat'l Coalition Against Domestic Violence ed.,
2005), available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/DV Facts.pdf.
2. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, supra note 1.
3. Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Sub-
stantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002); Celeste E. Byrom, Note,
The Use of the Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception in the Prosecution of Domestic
Violence Cases After Crawford v. Washington, 24 REV. LITIG. 409, 410 (2005) ("vic-
tims of domestic violence are nine times more likely than victims of non-domestic
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reasons for refusing to participate in the prosecution or for re-
canting their testimony, including physical or sexual assaults
prior to trial, fear of retaliation once the batterer is released
from incarceration, financial hardships caused by the abuser,
and harm or threatened harm to the victim's family or chil-
dren.4 Although the impetus creating uncooperative victims is
often unique, the result is too often the same: the defendant's
violence toward the victim undermines the criminal justice sys-
tem's effort at accountability.
In response to defendants' efforts to avoid accountability,
prosecutors created a new legal species: victimless prosecutions.
Proceeding without the victim's in-court testimony, prosecutors
relied on hearsay exceptions to admit the victim's statements to
911, police, and medical personnel. 5 Having found a point of
convergence between the Court's Confrontation Clause deci-
sions and current hearsay rules, prosecutors were able to pur-
sue victimless prosecutions and the jury was allowed to
consider the victim's initial statements to 911 operators, police
officers, and doctors about the violent incident as substantive
evidence of the crime.6
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford v. Washington7 dramatically hobbled the prosecution
of domestic violence offenses. In Crawford, the Court severed
the link between confrontation and hearsay and shifted the
Confrontation Clause analysis from satisfaction of hearsay
rules to cross-examination for "testimonial" statements. Under-
lying this transformation was the Court's recognition that
cross-examination is the sole constitutionally relevant determi-
nant of reliability. The post-Crawford world offers few opportu-
nities for victimless prosecutions.8  Consequently, some
jurisdictions have reported dismissing over seventy percent of
assault to request that their cases be dropped, and estimates of the attrition rate of
victim-initiated cases reach as high as eighty percent.").
4. Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 4; Byrom, supra note 3, at 410.
5. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1171, 1190 (2002).
6. Id.
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006) (determining that
some 911 calls are not testimonial). In this limited context, as the facts of Davis
demonstrate, a victimless prosecution built on the 911 call is still possible.
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their domestic violence cases.9 Largely, the Court's Confronta-
tion Clause shift from hearsay rules to testimonial statements
means that domestic violence prosecutions will only proceed
when the victim testifies and is subjected to cross-examination.
The Crawford decision also exposes an additional obstacle
to domestic violence prosecutions that is neither necessary nor
constitutionally mandated: even when the prosecution complies
with Crawford's command and the victim testifies in court, cur-
rent hearsay rules needlessly prevent the jury from fully consid-
ering the victim's testimony. Federal and state rules of
evidence largely prevent the jury from considering the victim's
prior inconsistent statements about the incident as substantive
evidence of the crime. By the time of trial, over eighty percent
of domestic violence victims recant their initial statements
describing the defendant's violent conduct, primarily due to
pressure from the defendant. 10 In the post-Crawford world, the
combination of the Confrontation Clause and the rules of evi-
dence require the victim to testify. However, in most cases, the
jury is precluded from considering her initial statements about
the violence, except possibly for impeachment purposes.
The domestic violence prosecutor, therefore, is in the worst
of both worlds, because in the vast majority of cases he is una-
ble to present to the jury the victim's first statements about the
defendant's violent conduct. The prosecution cannot proceed
without the victim, but even when she does testify, her most
relevant statements are not admissible. The batterer, on the
other hand, gains a double benefit from his violence toward the
victim. When the victim refuses to testify, the Confrontation
Clause compels dismissal, and when the victim recants the ini-
tial statements, the rules of evidence shield the defendant from
the victim's most damaging testimony.
I propose that the solution to this unnecessary obstacle to
domestic violence prosecutions and to this undeserved benefit to
the defendant is to allow the jury to consider prior inconsistent
9. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747,
750 (2005).
10. Id. at 768-69 (discussing research indicating that between eighty and
ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant or refuse to participate in the
prosecution and stating that "[tihe reasons why victims refuse to cooperate with
the prosecution are manifold, but chief among them is the risk of reprisals by the
batterers.").
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statements of a testifying witness as substantive evidence of the
charged crime. Such an amendment is well-founded for numer-
ous reasons.
First, it is completely consistent with Crawford and with
the Confrontation Clause. Crawford held that a witness's prior
statement implicating the defendant may be testimonial and
that the Sixth Amendment requires the witness to be in court,
subject to cross-examination." Significantly, the Crawford
Court did not impose any other admissibility requirements on
testimonial statements. With that in mind, current Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 12 which imposes a requirement
that the prior statement be made under oath, seems to contra-
dict Crawford. In addition, the Crawford Court recognized that
cross-examination is the only constitutionally relevant reliabil-
ity determinant. 13 As a result, by requiring an oath, Rule
801(d)(1)(A) imposes a separate and unnecessary reliability
aspect.
Additionally, allowing substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements recognizes the intent behind the rule as originally
proposed: preventing witness intimidation. 14 In 1972, the Su-
preme Court proposed allowing the substantive use of prior in-
consistent statements of witnesses who testified in court and
were subject to cross-examination. 15 Largely due to the impact
of Watergate, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's rule. Re-
storing the Supreme Court's proposed rule is even more rele-
vant today in light of Crawford's new limitations and the
witness intimidation that is rampant in domestic violence
cases.16
11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68.
12. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
14. Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 93d Cong. 50-51 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Prof.
Edward W. Clear, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence), reprinted in 4
JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1980).
15. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 34 L. Ed. 2d
5, 88 (1972) (Proposed Official Draft), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., COURSE OF
STUDY: PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 505, 598 (1975).
16. The Court has recognized the importance of addressing witness intimida-
tion in domestic violence cases, relying primarily on the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
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Section II of this article discusses the Crawford decision.
Since much has already been written about Crawford, Section
II will only briefly discuss the Court's separation of the hearsay
rules from the Confrontation Clause. This section will focus on
the Crawford decision from the perspective of the relationship
between the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements. Section III examines the history of the
rule precluding substantive use of prior inconsistent state-
ments, including a brief look at the common law's treatment of
such statements. This section emphasizes the convoluted his-
tory of the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)-which is primarily the
current state of the law-and also explores some of the states
that follow the minority position with regard to admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements.
Section IV discusses the dynamics of domestic violence re-
lationships and the need to address witness intimidation. This
section also briefly addresses forfeiture by wrongdoing, specifi-
cally how the same concerns underlie both forfeiture by wrong-
doing and admission of prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence. Section V addresses the arguments for
and against the adoption of a rule allowing the use of prior in-
consistent statements as substantive evidence. In this section, I
argue that this amendment to the rules of evidence is consistent
with the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
and is critical to society's efforts to combat domestic violence.
U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)) (noting that a defendant has a constitutional right to con-
front the witnesses against him, but he cannot assert that right if he procured a
witness' absence); see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). While the
Court has recognized the importance of forfeiture by wrongdoing as a counter to
the defendant's ability to use the Confrontation Clause as a sword, the forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine addresses only a small portion of the witness intimidation
present in domestic violence cases and, more importantly, has no deterrent effect
when the victim recants in court. However, the same rationale supports both for-
feiture by wrongdoing and the admission of prior inconsistent statements as sub-
stantive evidence. Amending the evidence rule, therefore, is critical to preventing
the defendant from gaining the benefit of his violence and will fill the gap left by
the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. For a complete discussion of this point, see
infra text accompanying notes 160-65.
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II. Crawford v. Washington
In the spring of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford
v. Washington,17 fundamentally changing the analysis of both
hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. First, the Court sepa-
rated the analysis of whether the Confrontation Clause is satis-
fied from the determination of whether particular hearsay rule
exceptions are met.'8 Since its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts,
the Court had largely equated Confrontation Clause analysis
with hearsay exception analysis. 19 In Crawford, the Court over-
turned Ohio v. Roberts and the Roberts test for satisfaction of
the Confrontation Clause-whether the hearsay statement met
a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore other "particular
guarantees of trustworthiness." 20 The Court replaced the Rob-
erts test with a rule stating that the Confrontation Clause re-
quires that the defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine
any testimonial statements. 21
Underlying the Court's decision to overturn Roberts was
the Court's conclusion that Roberts created a non-constitution-
ally mandated "reliability" determination. 22 The Court found
that cross-examination is the only reliability determinant con-
stitutionally mandated by the Confrontation Clause.23As the
Court stated, the Confrontation Clause "commands, not that ev-
idence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particu-
lar manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 24
In support of this proposition, the Court drew upon a statement
by Matthew Hale claiming that cross-examination "beats and
bolts out the Truth much better."25
Second, the Court divided the universe of hearsay state-
ments into those that are testimonial and those that are nontes-
timonial, stating that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
18. Id. at 68.
19. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
21. Id. at 68.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Id. at 67-68.
24. Id. at 61.
25. Id. at 62 (quoting MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (1713)).
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Clause demands that the defendant have an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant of any testimonial hearsay.26 The
Court appeared to exempt nontestimonial hearsay (or testimo-
nial statements not offered for their truth) from the Confronta-
tion Clause altogether, leaving the development of
nontestimonial hearsay rules to the states. 27 In its most recent
Crawford progeny case, Davis v. Washington, the Court seemed
to reiterate this point: "It is the testimonial character of the
statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while sub-
ject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not sub-
ject to the Confrontation Clause. ' 28
While the Court did not define testimonial, the Court
clearly did not limit testimonial statements to those that were
made under oath. The Court stated: "Statements taken by po-
lice officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial
under even a narrow standard. Police interrogations bear a
striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in
England. The statements are not sworn testimony, but the ab-
sence of oath was not dispositive."29
The Crawford decision has prompted extensive discussion
as courts and commentators struggle with the changes the
Court made in Confrontation Clause law. 30 Most of this discus-
sion has centered on the propriety of the changes and the defini-
tion of what constitutes a testimonial statement.31 These two
questions are beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this arti-
26. Id. at 68.
27. Id.
28. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006) (emphasis added).
29. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
30. For instance, simply typing (Crawford & "testimonial statement!") into
Westlaw's ALLCASES database receives 1375 hits. See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1353 (2006);
Rorry Kinnally, Comment, A Bad Case of Indigestion: Internalizing Changes in the
Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington Both Nationally and in Wis-
consin, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2006); Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitu-
tion, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 500 (2006); Kimberly McKelvey, Note, State v. Carter:
Rejecting Crawford v. Washington's Third Formulation as a Per Se Definition of
Testimonial, 67 MoNT. L. REV. 121 (2006).
31. See Susanne C. Walther, Pipe-Dreams of Truth and Fairness: Is Crawford
v. Washington a Breakthrough for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Rights?, 9
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 453 (2006); Alistair Y. Raymond, Note, Calling Crawford:
Minnesota Declares a 911 Call Non-Testimonial in State v. Wright, 58 ME. L. REV.
249 (2006); Kinnally, supra note 30; McKelvey, supra note 30.
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cle addresses the specific issue that flows from a determination
that a domestic violence victim's description of a violent inci-
dent is testimonial. It is necessary, therefore, to examine what
Crawford says about the use of prior statements of a witness
that fall within the testimonial category.
After Crawford, it is clear the Court severed the congruence
between hearsay and confrontation and elevated the Confronta-
tion Clause above the hearsay rules.32 However, the Court did
not spell out the role of the hearsay rules, if any, when the Con-
frontation Clause analysis deems a statement to be testimo-
nial.33 In footnote nine, the Crawford Court indicated that the
Confrontation Clause-once satisfied through the witness ap-
pearing and being subject to cross-examination-posed no addi-
tional obstacle to the use of the statement:
Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.
It is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of some out-of-court
statements cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to
the same matters in court. The Clause does not bar admission of
a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend
or explain it. 3
4
In this footnote, the majority is responding to then-Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which argues that the common law
had always recognized exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause. 35 Rehnquist argued that those recognized exceptions to
the Confrontation Clause served the public interest in the truth
and in an effective and efficient criminal justice system.36
Within this footnote, however, it is possible to see the Court
suggesting a more far-reaching conclusion regarding testimo-
nial statements: while making clear that the Confrontation
Clause poses no additional obstacles on the use of the prior tes-
timonial statement, the Court also seems to suggest there
32. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (noting that the Court will "leave for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.").
34. Id. at 59 n.9 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 74-76.
[Vol. 27:199206
2007] AN ARGUMENT FOR ORIGINAL INTENT
would be no hearsay bar to the use of the prior testimonial
statement.
Immediately after stating that the Confrontation Clause
does not restrict the use of prior testimonial statements, the
Court cited to its 1970 decision in California v. Green. In that
case, a witness's trial testimony differed significantly from
statements he gave the police and from testimony he gave at
the preliminary hearing.37 Under the California Evidence Code
in effect in 1967, prior inconsistent statements were admissible
as substantive evidence. 38 When the defendant's trial testi-
mony differed from his earlier statements, the prosecution read
to the jury the defendant's statements to the police and his tes-
timony at the preliminary hearing. 39 The California Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment precluded the substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements as evidence of the
charged crime when those statements had not been subject to
cross-examination at the time they were made.40 The United
States Supreme Court disagreed with the California Supreme
Court and reversed. 41
The Green Court considered the issue before it to be
whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits a state from enact-
ing an evidentiary rule permitting the substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements. 42 In framing this issue, the Supreme
Court identified two established views in the common law.43
First, the Court identified the "orthodox view," which held that
prior inconsistent statements were inadmissible for substantive
purposes, although they could be admissible for impeachment
purposes.44 The Court identified three concerns underlying the
orthodox position: "the statement may not have been made
under oath; the declarant may not have been subjected to cross-
examination when he made the statement; and the jury cannot
37. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151-52 (1970).
38. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 2006). This particular section of Califor-
nia's Evidence Code has gone essentially unchanged since first becoming operative
in 1967.
39. Green, 399 U.S. at 152.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 155.
43. Id. at 154-55.
44. Id. at 164.
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observe the declarant's demeanor at the time he made the state-
ment."45 The Court next identified the "minority view," which
allowed substantive use of prior inconsistent statements of a de-
clarant testifying at trial. 46 According to the proponents of the
minority position, the
usual dangers of hearsay are largely nonexistent where the wit-
ness testifies at trial. 'The whole purpose of the Hearsay rule had
been already satisfied [because] the witness is present and subject
to cross-examination [and] there is ample opportunity to test him
as to the basis for his former statement.'47
The Green Court also considered the history of the Confron-
tation Clause.48 In a section of the opinion that sounds remark-
ably similar to Crawford, Justice White indicated that the
Confrontation Clause was included in the Constitution in re-
sponse to the abuses present in Sir Walter Raleigh's case. 49 The
Court found that the history of the Confrontation Clause did not
preclude the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
when the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination. 50
The Court compared the purposes behind confrontation
with the dangers of admitting hearsay evidence. 51 According to
the Court:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his state-
ments under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of
the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a pen-
alty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examina-
tion, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth;' (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to
observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,
thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 52
While recognizing that the prior statements of the witness may
not have been under oath or subject to cross-examination at the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 154-55.
47. Id. at 155 (quoting 3 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed.
1940)).
48. Id. at 156.
49. Id. at 157 n.10.
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 162-64.
52. Id. at 158.
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time of the making, the Court held that when the witness testi-
fies in court and is subject to cross-examination, the statement
"regains most of the lost protections" and the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied. 53
While the Court stated that it was not deciding which of the
two positions was "sounder" as a matter of law,54 in reaching its
decision, it rejected the arguments in favor of the "orthodox"
view. 55 First, the Court found that because the current state-
ment is under oath, it overcomes concerns about the prior state-
ment being unsworn. 56 According to the Court, the witness
must still declare under oath and under threat of the penalty of
perjury that the prior statement was true or false.5 7
Second, the Court rejected the argument that "belated"
cross-examination was constitutionally insufficient to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause. 58 Rather than undermining the de-
fendant's confrontation rights, the Court indicated that the de-
fendant's ability to cross-examine the declarant is improved
when the witness recants. 59
The defendant's task in cross-examination is, of course, no
longer identical to the task that he would have faced if the wit-
ness had not changed his story and hence had to be examined as a
"'hostile"' witness giving evidence for the prosecution. This differ-
ence, however, far from lessening, may actually enhance the de-
fendant's ability to attack the prior statement. For the witness,
favorable to the defendant, should be more than willing to give
the usual suggested explanations for the inaccuracy of his prior
statement, such as faulty perception or undue haste in recounting
the event. Under such circumstances, the defendant is not likely
to be hampered in effectively attacking the prior statement, solely
because his attack comes later in time.60
Third, the Court rejected the notion that the jury is unable
to assess the demeanor of the declarant at the time he makes
53. Id.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 159-62.
56. Id. at 158-59.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 159.
59. Id. at 160.
60. Id.
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his earlier statement. 61 The Court found that the jury is able to
sufficiently assess the demeanor and credibility of the declarant
because the declarant is confronted with both statements in
front of the jury,62 and that the jury's ability to assess the de-
clarant's demeanor is constitutionally sufficient even though
some relevant demeanor evidence had been "forever lost."63
In holding that the Confrontation Clause does not preclude
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements-even
those prior statements that are unsworn and not cross-ex-
amined 64-the Court appeared to take a pragmatic view of the
Confrontation Clause:
[T]he question as we see it must be not whether one can somehow
imagine the jury in a "'better position,"' but whether subsequent
cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the trier
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement. On that issue, neither evidence nor reason convinces
us that contemporaneous cross-examination before the ultimate
trier of fact is so much more effective than subsequent examina-
tion that it must be made the touchstone of the Confrontation
Clause.65
Finally, the Green Court addressed a potential anomaly
that could result had it reached a contrary conclusion as to the
Confrontation Clause, namely that the prosecution might be
better off if the witness were unavailable and did not testify at
the trial.66 In its 1895 decision in Mattox v. United States, the
Court held that the admission of testimony, given at an earlier
trial by a witness who later died, did not violate the Confronta-
tion Clause.67 In addressing this issue, the Green Court stated:
It may be that the rules of evidence applicable in state or federal
courts would restrict resort to prior sworn testimony where the
declarant is present at the trial. But as a constitutional matter, it
is untenable to construe the Confrontation Clause to permit the
use of prior testimony to prove the State's case where the declar-
ant never appears, but to bar that testimony where the declarant
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 164.
65. Id. at 160-61.
66. Id. at 167 n.16.
67. 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
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is present at the trial, exposed to the defendant and the trier of
fact, and subject to cross-examination. 68
Therefore, in California v. Green, the Court made it clear
that the Confrontation Clause posed no obstacle to the admis-
sion of prior inconsistent statements-unsworn and not cross-
examined at the time of the making-as substantive evidence
as long as the declarant testifies in court and the defendant has
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.69 The Court
recognized, however, that the rules of evidence might work to
restrict the admission of those statements, even when the Con-
frontation Clause would not.70
In citing with approval to California v. Green, the Crawford
Court clearly had the foregoing discussion in mind.71 Thus, it is
well-established that both before the birth of Roberts and after
its demise, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a state or
federal government from adopting an evidentiary rule allowing
prior inconsistent statements to be considered as substantive
evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence, and most state codes,
however, do exactly the opposite and adhere to the orthodox
rule. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the history sur-
rounding the adoption of the orthodox rule in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, as embodied in the codification of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).
III. The History of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court approved
an evidentiary rule that allowed for substantive use of prior in-
consistent statements when the declarant testified in court and
was subject to cross-examination. 72 The Court's rule, however,
did not survive the legislative process; rather, the version
adopted by Congress limited substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements to those given under oath in formal proceed-
68. Green, 399 U.S. at 166-67.
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. at 166-67.
71. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).
72. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 34 L. Ed. 2d
5, 88 (1972) (Proposed Official Draft), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15,
at 505, 598.
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ings. 73 While subject to much scholarly criticism, Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) has remained the rule for three de-
cades and the majority position in most states.74
A. From the Common Law to Codification
At the common law, prior inconsistent statements of wit-
nesses were considered hearsay, 75 which precluded admission of
out-of-court statements of declarants offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.76 As out-of-court hearsay statements,
prior inconsistent statements were not admissible as substan-
tive evidence of the charged crime. However, the common law
did permit the limited use of prior inconsistent statements for
impeachment purposes only because the statement was not be-
ing considered for its truth.77
In 1961, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an advisory
committee to "study the advisability and feasibility of uniform
rules of evidence" for use in Federal courts."78 After the Com-
mittee recommended the promulgation of uniform federal rules
of evidence, an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence was
created and charged with developing rules of evidence for adop-
tion and promulgation by the Supreme Court.79 The Advisory
Committee was comprised of judges, lawyers, and professors,80
and in 1969, after four years of work, the Committee issued a
preliminary draft of uniform federal rules of evidence.81 In that
preliminary draft, the Advisory Committee proposed a major
change in the common law dealing with prior inconsistent state-
73. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. (1974).
74. Stanley A. Goldman, Guilt by Intuition: The Insufficiency of Prior Incon-
sistent Statements to Convict, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986). For criticisms of Rule
801(d)(1)(A), see Jennifer L. Hilliard, Note, Substantive Admissibility of a Non-
Party Witness' Prior Inconsistent Statements: Pennsylvania Adopts the Modern
View, 32 VILL. L. REV. 471 (1987); Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a
Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 277, 299
(1996).
75. 30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7011
(2006).
76. Goldman, supra note 74, at 5-6.
77. Id.
78. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051.
79. Id. at 7052.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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ments, rejecting the common law restrictions and proposing in-
stead the following definition of hearsay:
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, unless...
(2) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with his testi-
mony .... 82
In its comments, the Advisory Committee noted
"[c]onsiderable controversy has attended the question whether
a prior out-of-court statement by a person now available for
cross-examination concerning it, under oath and in the presence
of the trier of fact, should be classed as hearsay." 3 The Advi-
sory Committee identified the arguments in favor of the com-
mon law treatment of prior inconsistent statements as the
absence of the oath, of cross-examination, and of the opportu-
nity to assess the demeanor of the declarant while making the
statement.8 4 However, the Advisory Committee found these ar-
guments unpersuasive, relying extensively on the comments of
a California Law Revision Commission that considered substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements:
Section 1235 admits inconsistent statements of witnesses because
the dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect
are largely nonexistent. The declarant is in court and may be ex-
amined and cross-examined in regard to his statements and their
subject matter. In many cases, the inconsistent statement is more
likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at the trial be-
cause it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates
and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy that gave rise
to the litigation. The trier of fact has the declarant before it and
can observe his demeanor and the nature of his testimony as he
denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency. Hence, it is in
as good a position to determine the truth or falsity of the prior
statement as it is to determine the truth or falsity of the inconsis-
tent testimony given in court. Moreover, Section 1235 will provide
a party with desirable protection against the "turncoat'" witness
82. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (1969) (discussing Rule 8-
01(c)(2)).
83. Id. at 335.
84. Id.
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who changes his story on the stand and deprives the party calling
him of evidence essential to his case.8 5
In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States approved the
Advisory Committee's version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A).s6
After the Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Congress reacted immediately and passed legislation
delaying the effective date of the Federal Rules until "expressly
approved by Congress."87 The new Supreme Court rules
prompted dramatic speeches from members of Congress. For
instance, Representative Podell of New York stated:
The effects of these new rules upon our system of justice could be
disastrous. Rules of evidence determine whether a case is won or
lost .... These rules will replace the common law evidentiary
rules which are currently employed by our courts, rules which
were developed over a period of centuries of application and con-
stant refinement. The far-reaching consequences of these rules
make it incumbent upon us to subject them to a detailed, search-
ing inquiry. We cannot allow them to go into effect without first
determining what the consequences of them will be on our courts
and on our people.88
85. Id. at 337 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 2006) (Law Review Com-
mission Comments)) (emphasis added).
86. Michael H. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment
and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1565, 1565
(1977) (citing Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 184 (1972)).
87. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7052.
Congress expressed concern over the Supreme Court's authority to adopt rules for
the federal courts which are under Congressional jurisdiction. Congress reacted
strongly to this perceived violation of separation of powers. Another major concern
that prompted Congressional action was the Supreme Court's changes to the laws
of privilege. For many on Congress, the Supreme Court's proposed privilege rule
undermined state sovereignty and raised serious federalism concerns. Id. at 7053.
As Rep. Bertram L. Podell testified:
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Congress alone has the right to set rules of
evidence or to delegate that authority by specific acts of Congress. Congress
first asserted its authority to prescribe the law to be followed by the Federal
courts in the Rules of Decision Act of 1789. I do not believe that this at-
tempt to usurp that power should go unchallenged.
Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Crimi-
nal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (testimony of Rep. Podell, given on February 7, 1973), reprinted
in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14.
88. House Hearings, supra note 87, at 5-6 (testimony of Rep. Podell).
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Conversely, Senator Hruska considered the rules
"landmark legislation in the improvement in the Federal judi-
cial process .... [These rules are] designed to assist in reaching
the objectives in every trial-truth and justice."8 9
To better understand the feverish zeal pulsing through
Congress's consideration of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is
important to view the moment in its historical context: Viet-
nam, the Pentagon Papers, and Watergate. As Congress ex-
amined the Federal Rules, the country was in the middle of a
national crisis over federal officials, sworn to uphold the laws
and the Constitution, who were actively involved in both violat-
ing the law and making false statements regarding their activi-
ties. On February 7, 1973, the same day the House heard
testimony on the Federal Rules, the Senate unanimously voted
to create the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activ-
ities to investigate Watergate and possible White House in-
volvement. 90 Representative Elizabeth Holtzman introduced
the House hearings with the following remarks:
I think also, in view of the nationwide discussions of the newspa-
perman's privilege and Government secrets, it is extremely im-
portant that we scrutinize the rules-which concern both these
subjects-with the greatest care. The Congress has been the sub-
ject of a great deal of criticism in terms of its failing to respond to
many of the critical issues of our times. I think there is impera-
tive need for us to give the utmost attention to the review of these
rules.91
Throughout the entire time Congress considered the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and prior inconsistent statements, it was
also consumed on an unprecedented level with the Watergate
scandal. For instance, from May 17, 1973, to August 7, 1973,
and September 24, 1973, to February 6, 1974, the Senate held
daily televised hearings on Watergate.92 On July 7, 1973, Presi-
89. 120 CONG. REC. S19905-06 (1974), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note
15, at 393-94.
90. Watergate Chronology, http://www.watergate.info/chronology/1973.shtml
(last visited July 25, 2006) [hereinafter Watergate Chronology 1973]; House Hear-
ings, supra note 87.
91. House Hearings, supra note 87, at 5 (testimony of Rep. Holtzman).
92. See generally Watergate: Chronology of a Crisis, CONG. Q. (1975); The Mu-
seum of Broadcast Communications, Watergate, http://www.museum.tv/archives/
etv/W/htmlW/watergate/watergate.htm (last visited July 25, 2006).
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dent Nixon refused to testify before the Senate Committee and
refused, on grounds of executive privilege, to provide the Com-
mittee with requested documents.93 Shortly thereafter, the na-
tion learned how President Nixon secretly taped all of his
conversations in the White House.94 President Nixon initially
refused to release any of the tapes of those conversations, 95 but
later agreed to release redacted tapes without providing the
Senate with the redacted portions. 96 On February 6, 1974, the
House authorized the House Judiciary Committee to investi-
gate whether sufficient evidence supported grounds for im-
peachment of President Nixon.97 In May 1974, the House began
impeachment hearings which resulted in the return of three ar-
ticles of impeachment on July 27, 1974.98 To avoid impeach-
ment, President Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974.99
The Supreme Court's changes to the common law of prior
inconsistent statements failed to survive Congressional scru-
tiny. 100 The House held six days of hearings on the rules of evi-
dence generally and prior inconsistent statements
specifically.101 In addition, the House sought extensive input
from the bench and bar across the country. 10 2 United States
District Court Judge Henry J. Friendly submitted both oral and
93. Watergate Chronology 1973, supra note 90; J. Allan Cobb, Evidentiary Is-
sues Concerning Online "Sting" Operations: A Hypothetical-Based Analysis Re-
garding Authentication, Identification, and Admissibility of Online
Conversations-A Novel Test for the Application of Old Rules to New Crimes, 39
BRANDEIs L. J. 785 (2001).
94. Watergate Chronology 1973, supra note 90. Alexander P. Butterfield al-
leged that President Nixon taped all conversations occurring in the White House
starting in 1971, and on July 13, 1973, Butterfield informed the Senate of the
White House's audio taping system. Id.
95. Id. (discussing how Nixon refused the Senate's request on July 25, 1973).
96. Watergate Chronology 1973, supra note 90. See also Edward J. Im-
winkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories of Statutory Construction:
A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L.
REV. 389, 390 (1996).
97. Watergate Chronology, http://www.watergate.info/chronology/1974.shtml
(last visited July 25, 2006).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For details on the battles within Congress, see Graham, supra note 86.
101. House Hearings, supra note 87 (noting that the dates of the hearings
were Feb. 7, 8, 22, 28 and March 9, 15, 1973).
102. 120 CONG. REC. S19906 (1974), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note
15, at 394.
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written testimony against the Supreme Court's rule. In his
written statement, Judge Friendly criticized Rule 801(d)(1):
This makes cross-examination a farce. The rule goes far beyond
any decided case dealing with federal crimes or any consideration
of sound policy .... While it may be constitutional under Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), it is basically inconsistent with
the spirit of the Supreme Court's effort to put real meaning into
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 10 3
The House passed a version of a prior inconsistent statements
rule limiting their substantive use to those statements made
under oath, subject to cross-examination, at a formal hearing.
The House bill (H.R. 5463) read: "(A) inconsistent with his tes-
timony and was given under oath subject to cross-examination,
and subject to the penalty of peijury at a trial or hearing or in a
deposition . ... 104
Four concerns underscored the House's modifications.
First, the House was concerned about possible disputes over
whether the prior statement had ever been made. 10 5 The
House, therefore, sought to limit the substantive use of prior
statements to those situations when the dispute was elimi-
nated, namely by establishing a requirement that the state-
ments have been made in a formal setting, such as a trial.10 6
Presumably, the fact that the statement would have been pre-
served on a record would eliminate arguments as to the fact of
the prior statement.
In his oral testimony before the House, Judge Friendly em-
phasized this concern:
What it means is-and this is the setting in which we see it ris-
ing, and particularly in criminal trials-a defendant calls a wit-
ness who says the defendant was not at the place, did not do the
things of which he is being accused. The Government then puts
on an agent who testifies to a statement, even an oral statement,
by this witness to the contrary. And under this rule the agent's
statement, which is controverted by the witness-there is no
103. House Hearings, supra note 87, at 264 (written statement of Henry J.
Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
given on February 22, 1973).
104. 120 CONG. REC. H559 (1974) (reading of the Clerk), reprinted in A.L.I. &
A.B.A., supra note 15, at 425.
105. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075.
106. Graham, supra note 86, at 1577.
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proof except the agent's own testimony that it had ever been
made-is used as affirmative evidence against the defendant.
That really revolts me. I was responsible for some modification of
the old rule that a prior inconsistent statement could be used only
for impeachment of a witness on the stand, but we limited it very
carefully to testimony in a previous trial or before a grand jury. I
find this rule absolutely indefensible. 10 7
In light of the historical context, it is not surprising that the
House debate over the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements reflected concern over whether the prior statement
had ever actually been made.
Second, the House expressed concerns over the reliability of
the prior inconsistent statements. 08 To this end, the House im-
posed additional limitations, requiring a prior statement be
made under oath and subject to cross-examination at the time it
was made. 0 9
Third, the House expressed a general concern that substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements could create a situation
where a criminal defendant was convicted solely on the basis of
a prior inconsistent statement, "even though the statement was
disputed by the witness' own testimony and no certain evidence
existed establishing that the witness had accurately recounted
the information in the statement and, more fundamentally, that
the statement had ever been made."110
The following exchange between Representative Dennis
and Axel Kleiboemer, a member of the staff of the Deputy Attor-
ney General, is telling:
Mr. Dennis. But you wind up with the rather unusual situation
that at least in theory in a criminal trial, you could arrive at a
conviction solely on a prior statement made out of court and not
subject to cross-examination which was diametrically opposed to
every word of testimony taken under oath before the jury. Isn't
that right?
107. House Hearings, supra note 87, at 252 (testimony of Henry J. Friendly,
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, given on Feb-
ruary 22, 1973).
108. Graham, supra note 86, at 1566.
109. See id. (discussing how Congress placed further restrictions on the prior
inconsistent statement rule initially proposed by the Advisory Committee).
110. Id. at 1577.
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Mr. Kleiboemer. That is absolutely correct. But I might mention
that under the present state of the law, we can formulate hypo-
thetical cases which permit that also. Take, for instance, dying
declarations-
Mr. Dennis. It does for a dying declaration which is a time-
honored exception. But you are not telling me that the present
state of the law in general permits any such results .... Maybe it
is right, but it is certainly not common or usual.
Mr. Kleiboemer. I cannot disagree that this is a change from the
majority rule. I think the majority ofjurisdictions do not have the
rule. But it appears to me upon review of the authorities-and I
believe the second circuit has a similar rule and the experience in
California, Kentucky, and Wisconsin ... that there is merit and
wisdom to this particular provision. Chief Judge Friendly recom-
mended a similar rule in United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929
(1964).111
Finally, the House acknowledged the importance of ad-
dressing witness intimidation. 1 12 While the Supreme Court rule
highlighted this as an important and positive aspect of its pro-
posed rule, House members opposed to the Supreme Court rule
often shifted the debate from witness intimidation by criminal
defendants to the danger of government misconduct and
fabrication of evidence. 1 3 For example, during one debate, Rep-
resentatives Mayne and Wiggins argued in favor of the Su-
preme Court rule." 4 Representative Mayne discussed cases in
which defendants avoided conviction when witnesses, under
pressure, recanted their testimony and left the prosecution
without recourse. 1 5 Representative Mayne argued that the Su-
preme Court rule was a "sound proposal.., that responds to the
needs of law enforcement and reacts to recent developments in
the law."1 6
111. House Hearings, supra note 87, at 270 (discussion between Rep. Dennis
and Mr. Kleiboemer).
112. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075.
113. See STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., H.R. 5463, at 26 (1973), reprinted in BAILEY
& TRELLES, supra note 14.
114. 120 CONG. REC. H560-61 (1974) (statements of Reps. Mayne and Wig-
gins), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15, at 426-27.
115. Id. at H561 (statement of Rep. Mayne), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A.,
supra note 15, at 427.
116. Id.
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Thereafter, Representative Wiggins identified the Supreme
Court rule as an "extremely meritorious amendment which
deals with a very practical problem in criminal cases."117 Repre-
sentative Wiggins also set out the realities of many narcotics
cases: a witness recants his grand jury testimony after being
"exposed to the realities of the street" and being "told if he testi-
fies as he testified before the grand jury that he and his family
are in serious jeopardy."118 In support of substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements, Representative Wiggins stated,
"[i]t provides an answer to an important practical problem con-
fronting prosecutors in narcotics cases and in organized crime
cases. It would be unwise in my opinion to deny them this im-
portant tool . . "119
In response to Representatives Mayne and Wiggins' argu-
ments, Representative Dennis cleverly shifted the issue of wit-
ness intimidation to official misconduct: "Maybe he changed his
story, not because the defense threatened him, but because the
cops beat him up the first time. That has happened, too .... ,,120
On February 6, 1974, the same day that the House began
investigating the impeachment of President Nixon, the House
passed the bill restricting substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements. 121 Nine months later, the Senate rejected the
House version of a prior inconsistent statement rule and voted
instead to adopt the Supreme Court's promulgated rule. 122
With respect to the prior inconsistent statement rule and
witness intimidation, the Senate heard testimony characteriz-
ing the issue as one of defendants undermining the criminal
justice system, in addition to testimony characterizing the issue
117. Id. (statement of Rep. Wiggins).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 120 CONG. REC. H562 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dennis), reprinted in
A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15, at 428.
121. Watergate Chronology 1973, supra note 90; 120 CONG. REC. H570 (1974),
reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15, at 436.
122. 120 CONG. REC. S19916 (1974), reprinted in A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note
15, at 404. Interestingly, after the extensive review by the House, the House rec-
ommended changes in nearly fifty percent of the rules proposed by the Supreme
Court. Id. The Senate modified only twelve of the sixty-two rules proposed by the
House and of the twelve, the Senate reinstated six versions of the Supreme Court
rules. Id. The rule dealing with prior inconsistent statements was one of the six
rules that the Senate sought to reinstate. Id.
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as one of government misconduct. Herbert Semmel, represen-
tative for the Washington Counsel of Lawyers, argued to the
Senate in favor of the House bill:
The problems of inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incom-
pleteness of out-of-court statements may be found in both written
and oral statements, although the problem is more acute in oral
statements. But written statements are also subject to distortion.
We are all familiar with the way a skilled investigator, be he a
lawyer, police officer, insurance claim agent, or private detective,
can listen to a potential witness and then prepare a statement for
signature by the witness which reflects the interest of the investi-
gator's client or agency. Adverse details are omitted; subtle
changes of emphasis are made. It is regrettable but true that
some lawyers will distort the truth to win a case and that some
police officers will do the same to 'solve' a crime, particularly one
which has aroused the public interest or caused public contro-
versy. Or the police officer may be seeking to put away a 'danger-
ous criminal' who the officer "knows" is guilty but against whom
evidence is lacking ....
It has sometimes been urged that use of prior statements is
needed to protect against coercion of prosecution witnesses in
criminal trials, particularly those involving defendants allegedly
connected with organized crime. The suggested solution, the in-
discriminate use of extra-judicial statements, far exceeds the
scope of any such problem, if indeed the problem is a real one. 123
The Senate also heard from Professor Edward W. Cleary,
who was concerned the restrictions in the House rule would "for
all practical purposes virtually ... destroy the utility of the rule
as a solution for the problems it was designed to meet, such as
fading memories, bribery, intimidation, and other influences
which cause witnesses to change their stories."1 24 The Senate
also considered the testimony of United States Attorney H. M.
Ray, who argued that "by admitting prior statements as affirm-
ative proof, the law can prevent those miscarriages of justice
that occur when witnesses are intimidated or otherwise improp-
erly influenced, or are motivated by malice or spite, to repudiate
their initial statements under circumstances enabling the jury
123. Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 302-03 (statement of Herbert Sem-
mell), reprinted in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14.
124. Id. at 51 (testimony of Prof. Edward W. Cleary, given on June 4, 1974).
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to discern the falsity of that repudiation."125 As opposed to the
House, the Senate tended to find more persuasive the concerns
about the government's ability to respond to defendants
manipulating the criminal justice system.
The Senate found the lack of an oath and contemporaneous
cross-examination to be remediable when the declarant testifies
under oath and is subject to cross-examination at the later
trial.126 In addition, the Senate labeled the House's cross-exam-
ination requirement as too broad, in that it precluded the use of
prior grand jury testimony. 127 Finally, the Senate found that
Supreme Court rule had "positive advantages," ' 28 stating, "[t]he
prior statement was made nearer in time to the events, when
memory was fresher and intervening influences had not been
brought into play. A realistic method is provided for dealing
with the turncoat witness who changes his story on the
stand."129
Since the Senate and House could not agree, the matter
was sent to a Conference Committee, which molded the version
of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) ultimately adopted by Congress. This ver-
sion reads:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testi-
mony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition .... 130
The final version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is essentially that desired
by the House, excepting the inclusion of "other proceedings"
which admits testimony before a grand jury. As the Note ac-
companying the Conference bill stated:
125. Id. at 109 (statement of H.M. Ray, United States Attorney, given on June
5, 1974).
126. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7062.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. (1975) (discussing Rule
801(d)(1)(A)).
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The Senate amendment drops the requirement that the prior
statement be given under oath subject to cross-examination and
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a
deposition.
The Conference adopts the Senate amendment with an
amendment, so that the rule now requires that the prior inconsis-
tent statement be given under oath subject to the penalty of per-
jury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.131
As one commentator expressed: "Enacted rule 801(d)(1)(A) lim-
its substantive admissibility to those prior inconsistent state-
ments for which there is (1) almost absolute certainty that the
statement was made and (2) additional assurances of reliability
and truthfulness because of the requirement that the prior
statement must have been given in a formal proceeding."132
The Conference Committee's compromise regarding prior
testimony before the grand jury highlights that Congressional
concern over government fabrication of evidence rose to the
fore. Testimony given to the grand jury is under oath in a for-
mal proceeding, and all grand jury testimony is preserved on
record. However, defense counsel is absent from the grand jury
and no witness's testimony is subjected to contemporaneous
cross-examination.
In conference, the House was willing to jettison its require-
ment of cross-examination in favor of allowing the government
the utility of prior grand jury testimony. 133 This demonstrates
that the House's-and ultimately Congress's-primary concern
was not ensuring cross-examination. Rather, Congress was pri-
marily interested in limiting substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements to those situations when the existence of the
initial statement is not in dispute. Viewed in light of the back-
drop of Watergate, elevating the issue of whether a statement
was made over the issue of cross-examination reflects the tri-
umph of those representatives fearful of government miscon-
duct, and the loss of those seeking to protect the justice system
from the effects of witness intimidation. In other words, the
131. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, H.R.
REP. No. 93-1597, at 10 (1974), reprinted in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14.
132. Graham, supra note 86, at 1578-79.
133. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1597 (1974), reprinted in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra
note 14.
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Conference "compromise" reflects that preventing witness in-
timidation took a back seat to preventing governmental misuse
of evidence.
By imposing unnecessary reliability requirements, the final
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) largely adheres
to the common law position that prior inconsistent statements
are only admissible for the purpose of impeaching the witness's
current testimony. If a number of factors are not met, then a
prior inconsistent statement is limited to impeachment. 34 De-
viating only slightly from the orthodox common law position,
the federal rule allows substantive use of the prior inconsistent
statement in the limited situation when the prior statement
was made under oath at a formal hearing135 and subject to
cross-examination at the time it was made.
B. State Practice with Prior Inconsistent Statements
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the vast majority of states adhered to the common law rule re-
jecting substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments. At that time, only six states-New Jersey, California,
Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin-departed from the
common law and allowed for the substantive use of prior incon-
sistent statements.' 36
Since Congress adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the vast major-
ity-forty-one-of the states allow some substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements. 137 Fourteen states have adopted evi-
dence rules identical to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A).138 In a com-
plete reversal, now at least seven states and the District of
Columbia follow the orthodox rule and allow no substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements. The remaining states allow
some substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, but place
reliability requirements on the statements above and beyond
testifying under oath at the trial and being subject to cross-ex-
134. See Graham, supra note 86, at 1568.
135. The federal rule also allows for the use of prior grand jury testimony
which, while under oath, is not subject to cross-examination.
136. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7062.
137. Hilliard, supra note 74, at 489.
138. Id. at 492.
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amination. 139 Interestingly, one-third of all states rejected Fed-
eral Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and have adopted evidence rules similar
to the original Supreme Court rule. These seventeen states per-
mit substantive use of prior inconsistent statements when the
declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. 140
Thus, the majority of jurisdictions refuse to allow substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements.
IV. The Domestic Violence Dynamic and Its Impact
on Prosecutions
In the same thirty years since Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, American society has seen increased
awareness of the epidemic of domestic violence and greater gov-
ernment intervention to eliminate the problem. Studies show
that twenty percent of American women have been physically
assaulted by a domestic partner.'4 ' The leading cause of injury
to American women every year is domestic violence,' 42 the lead-
ing indicator of child abuse is domestic violence, and the great-
est risk factor for children becoming violent adults is the
presence of domestic violence in their homes.143 In addition to
the human costs, domestic violence costs American businesses
billions of dollars a year. 44
Increased understanding of the problem has spawned
greater prosecutorial efforts to hold batterers accountable. Do-
mestic violence, however, poses many challenges to prosecution,
the most important of which is the very nature of the abusive
139. The following jurisdictions still adhere to the orthodox rule: Alabama
(Cloud v. Moon, 273 So. 2d 196, 200 (Ala. 1973)); District of Columbia (Turner v.
United States, 443 A.2d 542, 549 (D.C. 1982)); Louisiana (State v. Kimble, 375 So.
2d 76, 79 (La. 1979)); Maryland (Smith v. Branscome, 248 A.2d 455, 462 (Md.
1968)); New York (People v. Ramirez, 380 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div. 1976)); North
Carolina (State v. Erby, 289 S.E.2d 86, 88 (N.C. Ct. App.1982)); Rhode Island
(State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 25 (R.I. 1979)); Tennessee (Martin v. State, 584
S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979), overruled by State v. Rickman, 876
S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1994)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-403 (2006)).
140. Hilliard, supra note 74, at 491.
141. Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Vio-
lence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2003).
142. Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 34.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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relationship. Domestic violence relationships are largely built
on a power and control dynamic in which the batterer uses a
variety of tactics to subjugate the victim and establish his supe-
riority. 145 Some of these tactics might include physically and
sexually assaulting the victim, restricting or limiting the vic-
tim's access to financial resources, physically and emotionally
isolating the victim, harming or threatening to harm the vic-
tim's children or family, or depriving or interrupting the vic-
tim's sleep patterns. 146
As a result of this dynamic, the victim feels incredible pres-
sure not to alert authorities about the nature of the relationship
or to seek help to end the relationship. Unfortunately, only
about one-half of the violence that women experience is ever re-
ported to the police. 147 Even when police respond to a violent
incident and a prosecution is generated, studies indicate that
eighty to eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims refuse
to testify for the prosecution or recant their earlier statements
to the police about the violent incident for which the defendant
is charged. 48 Victims report that their refusal to testify stems
from fear of additional violence, concern over present or prior
threats not to disclose to police or prosecutors, economic coer-
cion, and anxiety about the safety of their children or family
members."49 After reviewing the research on recantation, one
commentator concluded that "recantation is the norm rather
than the exception, in domestic violence cases. This is hardly
surprising. Batterers put hydraulic pressures on domestic vio-
lence victims to recant, drop the case, or fail to appear at
trial." 50 By exerting pressure on the victim, the defendant
145. See id. at 4.
146. See Byrom, supra note 3, at 410.
147. Kovach, supra note 141, at 1116.
148. Lininger, supra note 9, at 768-69; Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman,
Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WoMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 102 (Michael
Steinman ed., 1991) ("Many victims who become witnesses in criminal cases
against their abusers are subject to threats, retaliation, and intimidation to coerce
their noncooperation with prosecutors."); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap
Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996) (stating that victims do not cooperate with the
prosecution in eighty to ninety percent of domestic violence cases).
149. De Sanctis, supra note 148, at 368-69.
150. Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 4.
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seeks to destroy the prosecution's case and to avoid accountabil-
ity for his violent conduct.
When the defendant successfully pressures the victim to re-
cant her initial report, the State's case is founded primarily on
Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Recantation thus converts the initial report
into a prior inconsistent statement, thereby eliminating the
substantive utility of the statement and restricting its use to
impeachment purposes:
Many batterers continue to prevent the truth from being told in
the courtroom by instilling fear in their victims. The legal system
provides the coerced victim ample opportunity to prevent the in-
troduction of reliable evidence. When a victim recants or fails to
appear at trial, the victim's words or actions combine with the
hearsay rule to exclude the victim's reliable out of court state-
ments. In turn, exclusion results in inadequate or a lack of sub-
stantive evidence with which to prove the offense. Since the
hearsay rule excludes reliable prior statements of the abuse, vic-
tim recantation and no-show at trial results in failure to charge,
dismissal, or acquittal in cases of domestic violence. 15 1
In addition to studies documenting recantation rates and
reasons behind those recantations, experts also report that re-
cantations are less credible than the initial reports of vio-
lence. 15 2 Prosecutors' offices appreciated the credibility of a
victim's initial statements, as well as the mounting forces caus-
ing victims to recant, and thus developed new strategies for
prosecuting domestic violence.'5 3 In the past ten to fifteen
years, prosecutors have attempted to respond to the defendant's
efforts to undermine the criminal justice system with a strategy
called "victimless prosecutions."
In a victimless prosecution, the government would proceed
to trial without the victim testifying in court.154 These types of
trials were made possible by the evidence rules governing ex-
cited utterances, present sense impressions, and statements to
151. Id. at 3.
152. Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Re-
flections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 920 (2005) ("victims usually tell the
truth about their abuse within 48 hours of the incident, but then often recant or
minimize it later on.").
153. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 5, at 1190.
154. Id.
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medical personnel. 155 Even when these initial statements were
inconsistent with the victim's recantation at trial, the jury was
allowed to consider them as substantive evidence of the charged
crime because the statements were admitted through hearsay
exceptions. In this way, the State largely avoided the rule
against substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, and
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was mostly an afterthought. Therefore, use of
these hearsay exceptions allowed the government to address
the individual and the societal harm resulting from domestic
violence even in situations when the batterer attempted to cir-
cumvent the criminal justice system by pressuring the victim to
change her testimony.
Prosecutors built their victimless domestic violence cases
on the hearsay exceptions because of Ohio v. Roberts, which
ruled that use of these exceptions did not violate the defen-
dant's confrontation rights.156 However, after the Supreme
Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington15 7 and Davis v.
Washington,158 it is clear that the future for victimless prosecu-
tions is now very limited.159 Because those cases essentially
held that victimless prosecutions, as they existed, conflicted
with the Confrontation Clause, prosecutors' creative responses
to defendants' efforts to undermine the criminal justice system
are now largely foreclosed. Post-Crawford, prosecution of do-
mestic violence cases will only proceed when the victim appears
in court and is subject to cross-examination.
In the current post-Crawford world, the State has lost the
ability to avoid Rule 801(d)(1)(A). As a result, the jury will
again be precluded from considering the recanting victim's ini-
tial statements as substantive evidence of the charged crime,
155. Id. See also Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Do-
mestic Violence in New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 171 (2002); Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse
Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding
the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 139-41 (1991)
(discussing present sense impression).
156. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (citing Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
157. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
158. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
159. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277 (allowing for limited use of 911 calls as
nontestimonial statements).
228 [Vol. 27:199
2007] AN ARGUMENT FOR ORIGINAL INTENT
and the defendant, yet again, has the ability to "prevent the
truth from being told."
Although Crawford and Davis have dramatically impacted
the State's ability to combat domestic violence and witness in-
timidation, the Court did recognize the reality of witness intimi-
dation in domestic violence cases. As the Court stated in Davis:
This particular type of crime [domestic violence] is notoriously
susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that
she does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation
Clause gives the criminal a windfall. We may not, however, viti-
ate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of al-
lowing the guilty to go free .... But when defendants seek to
undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence
from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not re-
quire courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist
the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain
from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial
system.160
The Court also acknowledged a constitutional remedy for
when the defendant's violence is responsible for the victim not
testifying: forfeiture by wrongdoing.161 When the defendant's
actions cause a witness not to testify, the defendant forfeits his
right to confront the absent witness. 162 The State may admit, as
substantive evidence, the absent witness's prior statements. 163
Although seldom used, the Court recognized that forfeiture by
wrongdoing is an exception to the Confrontation Clause:
The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly
made recourse to this doctrine [forfeiture by wrongdoing] less nec-
essary, because prosecutors could show the "reliability" of ex parte
statements more easily than they could show the defendant's pro-
curement of the witness's absence. Crawford, in overruling Rob-
erts, did not destroy the ability of courts to protect the integrity of
their proceedings.164
Importantly, the Court has recognized the conundrum in
which its Confrontation Clause change has placed the State.
160. Id. at 2279-80.
161. Id. at 2280.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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The State now has less ability to prosecute the defendant and to
counter the defendant's intimidation and coercion of the victim.
Yet, the Court's remedy of forfeiture by wrongdoing is only
available when the defendant's actions prevent the victim from
testifying at all. 165 When the victim appears in court but re-
cants her testimony, forfeiture by wrongdoing is unavailable,
leaving the defendant's intimidation and coercion to go
unchecked.
V. Restoring Original Intent-A Call for a New Rule
Allowing Substantive Use of Prior
Inconsistent Statements
Since Congress enacted the Federal Rules, the majority of
jurisdictions have limited substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements. 166 Consequently, in federal courts and in two-
thirds of all state courts, a domestic violence prosecutor faces a
considerable obstacle in Rule 801(d)(1)(A). This rule prevents
the jury from considering all of the relevant evidence of the
charged crime and allows the defendant to undermine the crim-
inal justice system by intimidating the victim into changing her
story.
As originally conceived, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) sought to protect
the criminal justice system from the corrupting influence of wit-
ness intimidation.167 Congress grafted oath and formality re-
quirements onto the original rule approved by the Supreme
Court, 68 yet critics contend that Congressional concern about
reliability was overblown and that the rule as adopted does lit-
165. In addition, forfeiture by wrongdoing in the domestic violence context is
difficult to establish. For an additional discussion of forfeiture by wrongdoing in
the domestic violence context, see Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A
Panacea for Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441
(2006).
166. See, e.g., Hilliard, supra note 74, at 489.
167. See Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 50-51 (testimony of Prof. Edward
W. Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, given on June 4,
1974). "Their effect [the House amendments] is for all practical purposes virtually
to destroy the utility of the rule as a solution for the problems it was designed to
meet, such as fading memories, bribery, intimidation, and other influences which
cause witnesses to change their stories." Id. at 51.
168. See S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7062.
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tle to address witness intimidation. 169 The import of this criti-
cism, until now, has largely been ignored, primarily due to
prosecutors' past abilities to circumnavigate the rule through
victimless prosecutions. 170 The impact of the rule governing
prior inconsistent statements was limited to those cases in
which the State was unable to proceed under another hearsay
exception. In those cases, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) would limit the
State to impeachment of a recanting victim, and without sub-
stantive evidence, the State would rarely be able to establish a
prima facie case.
In domestic violence prosecutions, however, the Supreme
Court's Crawford decision has largely closed those other hear-
say exception avenues to admit prior inconsistent statements
for substance evidence. Particularly in the domestic violence
context, the shortcomings of the current prior inconsistent
statement rule are no longer blunted. Without those hearsay
exceptions, the State is not able to proceed because the jury has
no substantive evidence of the charged crime. Rather than
preventing witness tampering and assisting the criminal justice
system, Rule 801(d)(1)(A)'s procedural safeguards assist the do-
mestic violence defendant and protect the witness intimidation
rampant in domestic violence prosecutions.
The Supreme Court's Crawford decision to enhance the de-
fendant's confrontation rights makes it critical that Congress
amend Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The rule should be restored to the
original Supreme Court rule which allowed for substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements when the witness is subject to
cross-examination. This modification will allow prosecutors to
pursue domestic violence prosecutions that fully ensure the de-
fendant's confrontation rights while also preventing the defen-
dant from exploiting the hearsay rule to undermine the
criminal justice system through witness intimidation.
Merely restoring the original Supreme Court rule does not
address the concerns of Congress. 171 To address these concerns,
169. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Friedman & McCormack, supra note 5.
171. The House focused on arguments surrounding the unreliability of prior
inconsistent statements rather than accepting the Advisory Committee's rationale
for withdrawal from the common law. In particular, the House worried about con-
victions resting on prior statements that were, in fact, a total fabrication. See Gra-
ham, supra note 86, at 1576.
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it is essential that two additional safeguards be attached to the
original Supreme Court rule. First, the fact of the prior state-
ment itself must be established. However, the reliability re-
quirements imposed by Congress-an oath and formal
proceeding-are too restrictive. Instead, the State should also
be able to establish the existence of the prior statement when
the witness acknowledges making the earlier statement or the
State demonstrates pre-trial that the witness made the earlier
statement. If the prior inconsistent statement is admitted for
substantive evidence, a second limitation is needed to fully re-
spond to Congressional concerns: the prior inconsistent state-
ment may not be the only evidence that supports the conviction.
In other words, the statement must be corroborated by other
evidence establishing the defendant's guilt. With these two ad-
ditional limitations, substantive use of prior inconsistent state-
ments will fulfill its original purpose-addressing witness
intimidation-and satisfy Congressional concern over govern-
mental misconduct and fabrication of evidence.
A. Dangers of Allowing Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent
Statements in Domestic Violence Prosecutions
Domestic violence victims tend to behave in a recognizable
and predictable fashion. At the scene and shortly thereafter,
the victim willingly provides police with statements explaining
how the defendant caused her injuries. At trial, the victim
changes her story and testifies that the defendant was not cul-
pable for her injuries. The reality that an enormous percentage
of domestic violence victims recant their initial reports about
the violence creates two unique and challenging problems for
substantive use of those earlier statements. 172
First, the victim has provided two different versions of the
same event and, by definition, the victim is not credible. The
State, however, will argue the jury should disregard the later
recantation and find the initial statements credible. Typically,
there is good reason for the jury to follow the prosecution's sug-
gestion. Since over eighty percent of domestic violence victims
recant, the odds exist that a jury will find credible a prior incon-
sistent statement and subsequently use that statement to find
172. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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the defendant guilty. The odds also exist, particularly when
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements is permitted,
that a defendant might be convicted when the prior inconsistent
statement is the only substantive evidence of the crime.
Allowing a conviction based solely on the prior statement of
a witness, who at some point is not credible, is problematic. The
days are long past when juries were instructed to view the com-
plaining witness in rape cases with distrust. The criminal jus-
tice system is comfortable with convictions solely based on the
testimony of victims. However, the recanting domestic violence
victim-because her testimony has changed-is different. To
maintain society's perception of fairness in jury verdicts, and
thus in the criminal justice system itself, a jury must not be
allowed to convict based solely on a prior inconsistent
statement.
More importantly, the typical pattern of the recanting do-
mestic violence victim creates an opportunity for government
misconduct. The government can exploit the domestic violence
dynamic and fabricate evidence implicating the defendant. For
example, it is not uncommon for police officers to respond re-
peatedly to the same address for domestic violence incidents.
After a subsequent call in which the victim refuses to detail how
the defendant caused her injuries, the officer could arrest the
defendant and then craft a "victim" statement implicating the
defendant. At trial, the victim would testify that the defendant
did not cause her injuries, and the State could admit the of-
ficer's fabricated statement as substantive evidence of the de-
fendant's crime.
This hypothetical raises the very concern Congress had
over government fabrication of evidence, albeit in a more prob-
lematic context. Congress hkoked at narcotics cases and organ-
ized crime. 173 Those cases clearly present the possibility of
witness intimidation. Domestic violence, however, presents not
mere possibility but well documented fact of witness intimida-
tion and victim recantation. The jury would not be surprised to
hear the domestic violence victim testify at trial that the defen-
dant did not cause her injuries. In fact, the dynamic of the re-
173. 120 CONG. REC. H561 (1974) (statement of Rep. Wiggins), reprinted in
A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15, at 427.
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canting domestic violence victim is so well established that the
jury will, perversely, discount the testimony of a victim who tes-
tifies consistently with the story she told the police. The jury,
therefore, will have a harder time ferreting out governmental
misconduct and fabrication of evidence in the domestic violence
context.
B. Arguments in Favor of a Modified Supreme Court Rule
While the Court stated that society cannot "vitiate constitu-
tional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the
guilty to go free,"174 the Court has acknowledged that, once the
Confrontation Clause is met, society is free to craft its own evi-
dentiary rules. Thus, the impact of an evidentiary rule on soci-
ety's ability to effectively enforce its criminal laws is a
significant factor in assessing the continued validity of the rule.
Currently, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) has an excessively detrimental im-
pact on effective domestic violence prosecutions. Modifying the
rule to allow substantive use of prior inconsistent statements,
however, does not "vitiate" a defendant's constitutional rights.
Rather, the modified rule will enhance the defendant's confron-
tation rights and allow society to attack the domestic violence
epidemic.
Three reasons support modifying the rule. First, the modi-
fication is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford. Second, the modified rule more appropriately bal-
ances the interests in preventing witness intimidation and pro-
tecting against government fabrication of evidence. Third,
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements will dramati-
cally assist society's efforts against domestic violence. The mod-
ified rule will also address the two dangers of substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements in domestic violence prosecutions,
thereby guaranteeing that defendant's rights are protected and
society's interest in fair and impartial criminal justice is
preserved.
174. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
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1. The Modified Rule is Consistent with the Crawford
Decision
Amending Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to allow substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements is consistent with Crawford's
mandates. Recall that the Crawford Court revitalized a defen-
dant's confrontation rights, ensuring the defendant a right to
cross-examine the maker of statements that implicate the de-
fendant in criminal conduct. 175 Also, in reaffirming California
v. Green, the Crawford Court breathed life into two principles:
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements is consistent
with enhanced Sixth Amendment protection, and cross-exami-
nation, as opposed to an oath or formal proceeding, is the sole
determinant of reliability. Thus, under Crawford and other Su-
preme Court precedent, a defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights are satisfied by the opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness at trial.176 In fact, the Court went so far as to say that all
other reliability determinants are irrelevant. 177
The original Supreme Court rule allowing substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements is consistent with Crawford
and Green because cross-examination is the only factor it uses
to determine the reliability of the statement. Conversely, the
current version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is inconsistent with Craw-
ford because it imposes two additional reliability requirements,
mandating that the prior statement be made under oath at a
formal hearing. 78 In other words, the current rule determines
that only those statements made under oath and in a formal
hearing are reliable enough to be subjected to cross-examina-
tion and employed by the jury. This is directly in conflict with
Crawford's commitment to cross-examination as the sole consti-
tutional reliability determinant. Crawford specifically found
that the presence of the oath and the initiation of formal pro-
ceedings are not essential to determining which statements
must be subject to cross-examination. 179
In addition, the current rule is internally inconsistent in its
commitment to cross-examination. In Congress, the Senate ad-
175. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
176. Id. at 59 n.9; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
177. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
178. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
179. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
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vocated adoption of the Supreme Court rule, and the House sup-
ported a rule that imposed a contemporaneous cross-
examination requirement on the prior statement.5 0 However,
in the final version of the bill that emerged from the Conference
Committee, the contemporaneous cross-examination require-
ment was eliminated by a compromise which opened the door to
substantive use of prior grand jury testimony.' 8 ' The current
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), therefore, partially recognizes that subse-
quent cross-examination of a prior statement is sufficient, at
least insofar as prior grand jury testimony is concerned. In a
grand jury context, the current rule finds that later cross-exam-
ination at trial provides the defendant adequate confrontation.
Yet in all other contexts, the current rule provides that cross-
examination at trial is not sufficient to provide adequate con-
frontation. Again, this flies in the face of Crawford. The origi-
nal Supreme Court rule suffers from none of these failings. It
places its sole emphasis on cross-examination and treats all
statements equally with respect to that one requirement.
The original Supreme Court rule is also consistent with
Crawford and Davis in another way: it recognizes the negative
impact of witness intimidation on the search for truth. In
Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court recognized that wit-
ness intimidation in domestic violence cases is a problem that
potentially undermines the criminal justice system.8 2 The
Court articulated concern that the defendant could exploit his
confrontation rights. For instance, through violence or intimi-
dation, a defendant could prevent a witness from appearing in
court and testifying. When the witness is subsequently absent
from trial, the defendant could assert his confrontation rights to
preclude the admission of the unavailable witness's inculpatory
statements. Since the inclupatory statements are most likely
testimonial, the Confrontation Clause would prevent their ad-
mission without the defendant having an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. The Davis Court emphasized that the de-
180. See S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7062.
181. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, H.R.
REP. No. 93-1597, at 10 (1974), reprinted in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14.
182. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-5 1; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280
(2006).
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fendant should not be permitted to exploit the Confrontation
Clause to sanction his witness intimidation. 8 3 To eliminate
this incentive, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to forfei-
ture by wrongdoing as an exception to the Confrontation
Clause. 84
In a similar fashion, current Rule 801(d)(1)(A) creates an
incentive for the defendant to engage in witness intimidation.
If a witness succumbs to pressure from the defendant and
changes her testimony, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) excludes the inculpa-
tory statement, unless it was made under oath at a prior hear-
ing. Since the most damaging statements in domestic violence
cases are those made to police, 911, and medical personnel
within the first forty-eight hours of the incident, it is unlikely
that these statements will satisfy the additional requirements
of the rule.8 5 The rule, therefore, shields the defendant from
the victim's most damaging testimony. Essentially, the current
rule gives the defendant incentive to force the victim to recant,
thus sanctioning the defendant's efforts in undermining the
criminal justice system.
The original Supreme Court rule allowing substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements, on the other hand, was specifi-
cally drafted to remedy witness intimidation. 8 6 Since the Su-
preme Court rule makes prior statements available to the jury
as substantive evidence, the defendant is denied the benefit of
having pressured the victim to change her story. Moreover,
both forfeiture by wrongdoing and substantive use of prior in-
consistent statements have the same rationale: preventing a de-
fendant from exploiting an evidentiary bar to influence a
criminal prosecution. Therefore, the original Supreme Court
rule, therefore, is consistent with Crawford and Davis, while
the current rule works to the opposite effect.
2. The Modified Rule Addresses Congress's Concerns
As originally conceived, the Supreme Court's prior inconsis-
tent statement rule was designed to combat witness intimida-
tion. During the Congressional debates, however, that concern
183. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
184. Id.
185. See Brodin, supra note 152, at 930.
186. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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shifted to one of government fabrication of evidence' 87-an obvi-
ous result of the unique historical context, i.e., Watergate, that
consumed Congress concurrently with its consideration of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Due to this historical convergence,
Congress placed too much emphasis on combating government
fabrication and lost sight of witness intimidation. The proposed
modified Supreme Court rule adequately addresses both
concerns.
As discussed in Section III, there is a high degree of congru-
ence between Watergate and Congress's adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. This is, perhaps, not surprising because
Watergate was largely an evidentiary conflict. However, this
intersection in history had unfortunate and deleterious effects
upon future domestic violence prosecutions. Rather than focus-
ing the Congressional hearings on the evidentiary concerns of
both the Advisory Committee and Supreme Court, the House
immersed itself in the politics of the day, turning Rule
801(d)(1)(A)'s focus from witness intimidation to government
fabrication. This changeover is not reducible to singular pro-
positions, yet the murmurs of Watergate are distinctly evident
in the transcripts of the House hearings.
In the face of this power struggle, and in the face of re-
peated evidence of government wrongdoing-including secrecy
and lies-it is not surprising that Congress exhibited height-
ened sensitivity to issues of governmental misconduct and
fabrication of evidence. Repeatedly, the debate in Congress re-
turned to the concern that the government might misuse pro-
posed Rule 801(d)(1)(A) by fabricating evidence of a prior
statement to attack a witness's testimony denying the defen-
dant's culpability. For instance, during one debate, Representa-
tive Dennis stated that the witness may have "changed his
story, not because the defense threatened him, but because the
cops beat him up the first time."188 Similar sentiments were ex-
pressed during the Senate debates.18 9
Congress grafted the oath and formal hearing requirements
onto the Supreme Court's prior inconsistent statement rule,
187. Graham, supra note 86, at 1576.
188. 120 CONG. REc. H562 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dennis), reprinted in
A.L.I. & A.B.A., supra note 15, at 428.
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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manifesting sensitivity to the issue of government fabrication of
evidence. These requirements were designed to eliminate any
dispute over the actual existence of the prior inconsistent state-
ment. To this end, these requirements are extremely effective
because, essentially, the prior statement must have been on the
record in some way: deposition, hearing, trial, or grand jury
testimony.
While the historical context of Watergate correctly led Con-
gress to appreciate the potential for governmental abuse with
prior inconsistent statements, the historical context also led
Congress to overwrite its solution to the problem. For instance,
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not take into account the situation where
the witness freely admits giving a prior statement to a govern-
ment official. If that prior statement was not made under oath
at a formal hearing, it would not be admissible, even though the
witness acknowledges the actual existence of the statement.
When the witness is present and acknowledges the prior state-
ment, the dispute over the existence of that statement is elimi-
nated. In that context, it makes little sense to keep the
statement from the jury's consideration, particularly when the
declarant can explain the reasons behind the content of the ear-
lier statement at trial. Current Rule 801(d)(1)(A) excludes
these acknowledged statements from the jury. The modified
rule would not.
In a similar fashion, independent corroboration of the exis-
tence of the prior statement can be established outside of a for-
mal hearing. For instance, a witness might make a statement
to police in the presence of an uninvolved third party, or the
witness might call 911 and her prior statement might be re-
corded. In those situations, even if the witness were to deny
making the prior statement, the State could convincingly estab-
lish that the statement was, in fact, made. Again, the current
rule prevents the jury from considering these prior statements
as substantive evidence, even if corroborated. The modified
rule would provide the State the opportunity to convince a judge
pre-trial of the existence of the prior statement.
In addition to over-drafting the solution, Congressional
concern over government fabrication of evidence caused Con-
gress to underemphasize the issue of witness intimidation. Es-
sentially, the current rule cripples the prosecution's ability to
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address witness intimidation by creating a perverse incentive
for defendant's to coerce victims to change their stories. The
modified Supreme Court rule would create the opposite effect,
eliminating the secondary benefit to the defendant. The modi-
fied rule helps preserve the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem. As importantly, it balances both of Congress's concerns:
preventing witness intimidation and prohibiting government
fabrication of evidence.
VI. Conclusion
Prosecution of domestic violence is extremely difficult,
largely due to the fact that defendants are successfully pressur-
ing victims to refuse to testify or to recant their testimony at
trial. With its decision in Crawford, the Supreme Court elimi-
nated the ability of prosecutors to use hearsay exceptions to
place the domestic violence victim's statements before the jury
for their substantive consideration. The Supreme Court also
closed this avenue to combat defendants' efforts to avoid liabil-
ity through coercive pressure on victims. Therefore, the Court's
change in the Confrontation Clause law limits the prosecution's
arsenal for combating witness intimidation and, at the same
time, places an unwieldy Rule 801(d)(1)(A) squarely into play.
Unfortunately, the current rule is ineffective in assisting
domestic violence prosecutions and preventing witness intimi-
dation. When the defendant's pressure results in recantation,
rather than refusal to testify, the Court's forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing remedy to witness intimidation is not available. In this sit-
uation, the prosecution is left with a faulty witness and no prior
statement. The defendant, on the other hand, is the double ben-
eficiary of the Crawford decision: he has an enhanced right to
confront the victim and Rule 801(d)(1)(A) prevents redress of
his intimidation of the victim.
The modified rule, however, is able to properly align the
positive benefits of the Crawford decision by ensuring the de-
fendant's full confrontation rights and eliminating the incentive
to intimidate witnesses. In this way, allowing substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements is vital to society's efforts to
hold batterers accountable for the violence they inflict on their
victims.
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